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the issue was not raised. In Hess v. Marinari, 81 W. Va. 500, 94
S.E. 968 (1918), the West Virginia court said, in a case involving
joint defendants, that it was proper to consider the social and
pecuniary standing of the parties. Accord, Pendleton v. Norfolk
& Western Ry. Co., 82 W. Va. 270, 95 S.E. 941 (1918). See also
Binder v. G.M.A.C., 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d 894 (1943).
In the decision in the principal case, the court acknowledged
that a malicious or wanton tort-feasor might go unpunished, but on
the other hand the court felt that any other result would bring about
an unjust punishment of one joint tort-feasor. The court concluded,
in accordance with the well recognized principle of justice, that it
is better for several guilty persons to go unpunished than to have
one innocent person punished. But, should a wanton tort-feasor be
under the classification of 'innocent person'? The principal case, in
failing to differentiate between cases refusing evidence of wealth
and those refusing recovery of punitive damages, may also not
be in accord with the majority, as it purports to be. The better
result probably is that reached in those states allowing an apportionment of punitive damages among joint tort-feasors. Such a
result seems to solve the conflict between a meting out of punishishment on one hand and an undue punishment on the other.
Lee O'Hanlon Hill

Evidence-Admissibility of Tape Recordings Where Portions
Are Inaudible
Appeal from a conviction on two counts of extortion. Appellant
assigns as error the introduction into evidence of a recording, portions of which were inaudible. Held, where the inaudible portions
cannot be deemed so substantial as to render the whole untrustworthy, the admission into evidence of a tape recording, portions
of which were unintelligible, is not prejudicial error. Cape v. United
States, 283 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1960).
The instant case is the latest in a field of evidence law which
was virtually unknown in the not too distant past. Technical difficulties aside, the problem of partially inaudible recordings has been
raised in a number of recent cases with the question of admissibility
usually depending upon the amount of the indistinct portion and
the trial court's discretion. Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1038 (1958). Cape
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v. United States reason thusly: If a conversation is overheard by
a competent witness, the fact that such a witness was only able
to distinguish portions of what was said does not render the whole
inadmissible in evidence. By analogy then, the fact that the recorded
conversation is only partially complete will not render it inadmissible as to the parts which can be heard. This was essentially the
rule set out in United States v. Schanerman, 150 F.2d 491 (1945),
and the court in the Cape case cites that decision with approval.
This view has also found support in a number of state court
decisions. In a recent California case, People v. Dupree, 156 Cal.
App. 2d 60, 319 P.2d 39 (1957), citing also the cases of People v.
Curtis, 134 Cal. App. 2d 624, 286 P.2d 446 (1955), and People
v. Jackson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 776, 271 P.2d 196 (1954), the court
held that since a witness may testify to a part of a conversation heard
by him and such part appears to be intelligible, a tape recording not
entirely clear in itself could not be excluded from the jury's hearing.
This view was also approved by the Washington court in the case of
State v. Salle, 34 Wash. 2d 183, 208 ,P.2d 872, 877 (1949). There
the court expressed a strong inclination to allow the use of tape
recordings even though parts thereof were indistinct. However, in a
later case, State v. Slater, 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P.2d 329 (1950),
the Washington court seems to retreat somewhat from the view
expressed in the Salle case. In the later case the court observed that
where the tapes in question were inaudible to the point of being
fragmentary, and where it is the only evidence available as to its
contents, then serious doubts are raised as to the advisability of its
admission.
Some courts have been extremely wary of the use of these
mechanical marvels for the establishment of truth. The same California court mentioned previously, when confronted with a recording which the court declared to be fifty per cent inaudible, reversed
a lower court decision based in part on the evidence contained on
the tape. In this opinion the court pointed out the danger of the
jurors drawing many and varied conclusions from what they heard
or thought they heard on the recording. In Hunter v. Hunter, 169
Pa. 498, 82 A.2d 401, 403 (1951), the Pennsylvania court in a
suit for divorce demonstrated the ease with which tape recordings
can be altered by a skillful operator and then held flatly: "In general such conversations are admissible as a whole or not at all."
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There seems little doubt that recordings can be extremely valuable additions to the methods used to ascertain facts in judicial
proceedings. No matter how valuable, however, their use presents
an obvious danger when portions of them are inaudible. There is
reason to doubt the validity of the analogy drawn by some of the
courts between a witness testifying as to part of what he heard and
a recording which is partly indistinct. The sound of the accused's
own voice mouthing the incriminating statements should produce
a much more profound effect upon the jury than would testimony
by a witness who is obviously unsure of what he heard and who is
subject to cross-examination designed to illustrate that specific defect. With the recording each jury member is allowed to decide
what the indistinguishable words were and their relation to the rest
of the conversation. The protection suggested by some courts of
omitting the garbled portions and allowing the jury to hear only
those sections which are clearly distinct raises the old problem of
phrases lifted from their context giving oft times an exactly opposite impression than that for which they were originally intended.
These objections have been raised and set out clearly in the
case of Wright v. State, 38 Ala. 64, 79 So.2d 66 (1954), a decision by the Supreme Court of Alabama. Prefacing the opinion with
the statement that, ". . . enthusiasm for the modem should never be
permitted to endanger the safeguards of personal liberties. .. .", the

court points out the inherent dangers in the use of recordings, portions
of which are inaudible or unclear. The case holds that the value of
such evidence depends primarily upon its accuracy, and, where
the recording is inacurrate, the truth is more likely to be concealed
than produced. While reversing the trial court's judgment because
of the use of the inaudible tape, the Alabama court set forth a
guide for the use of trial court judges when confronted with the
problem of indistinct recordings. The court suggests: (1) That the
recording be run off first out of the presence of the jury in order
to afford counsel an opportunity to object, and further that a transcript of the audible portions of the tape be made at that time; (2) if
the recording is inaudible as to sections likely to be material to the
case, and if this is the only evidence of the statements offered, the recording should be rejected; (3) if the parties who were present at
the recording are present at the trial, the recording, even though
partially inaudible, should be admitted for the purpose of corroborating the evidence of these witnesses, and (4) if the recording contains
illegal evidence, it should be rejected in toto unless such illegal por-
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tions can be erased from it. The case seems to present a more
rational approach to the problem than does the principal case. It
is submitted that the caution necessary in the use of inaudible
recordings is not provided by the cases which base their admission
or exclusion on the analogy used by the court in the Cape case, and
that a more desirable approach is represented by the Wright decision.
John George Van Meter

Federal Courts-Jurisdictional Amount-Legal Certainty
In an action grounded on diversity of citizenship in the District
Court of the Southern District of West Virginia, P claimed damages in the amount of 6,000 dollars for breach of contract. P based
his claim on the premise that the statement for 2,960 dollars sent
to D for professional services as an architect was merely a compromise offer and could not become an account stated without the
acceptance by D. D moved to dismiss, challenging the jurisdiction
of the court on the ground that the amount actually in controversy
was less than 3,000 dollars because P could not recover more than
this amount by the terms of the contract. The motion was granted.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court was without
jurisdiction where, from a statement sent by P to D, it appeared as
a legal certainty that P could not recover the jurisdictional minimum.
Nixon v. Loyal Order of Moose Lodge No. 750, 285 F.2d 250
(4th Cir. 1960).
A federal court will dismiss a diversity action for want of jurisdiction if it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot
recover the jurisdictional minimum. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity
Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938). The federal district
court was bound to apply West Virginia law, Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and it thus appears that under the
facts of the principal case that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiff cannot recover an amount in excess of 3,000
dollars.
The court said that P's recovery was limited by the terms of
the written agreement. However, P contended that the statement
he sent was merely a compromise offer to D which was not accepted
by D. Furthermore, P contended that there was nothing in the
contract which made it incumbent upon him to make the reasonable
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